Using a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 1998-2014, we document strong evidence of investment inefficiency, which we explain through a combination of financing constraints and agency problems. Specifically, we argue that firms with cash flow below (above) their optimal level tend to under-(over-)invest as a consequence of financial constraints (agency costs). Furthermore, focusing on under-investing firms, we highlight that the sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow rise with traditionally used measures of financing constraints, whilst for over-investing firms, the sensitivities increase with a wide range of firm-specific measures of agency costs.
Introduction
Problems of information asymmetry between management and financial institutions, and agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors, as well as between management and shareholders have been found to significantly influence firms' investment decisions (Myers & Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; Fazzari et al. 1988; Abhyankar et al. 2005; Jiang et al. 2010 ). These problems are particularly severe in emerging markets. Given the significant capital market imperfections characterizing it and its poor corporate governance mechanisms (Allen et al., 2005) , the Chinese setting provides an ideal laboratory to study firms' investment decisions in the presence of both financial constraints and agency problems 1 .
China has been seen as a counter-example to most of the literature, which suggests a positive relationship between financial development and economic growth (Levine 2005) . Its under-developed financial system is in fact seriously out of step with its thriving growth (Allen et al. 2005) .
2
Internal finance, trade credit, and other informal funds might speak louder than bank or equity finance in explaining the Chinese growth miracle. In other words, the role of China's external markets in financing and allocating resources has been limited. This is due, first of all, to the fact that dominant state-owned banks are not efficient since they have plenty of nonperforming loans (NPLs). More importantly, they need to support massive unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is consequently difficult for private firms to access external funding (Allen et al. 2005; Héricourt & Poncet 2009; Guariglia et al. 2011) . Second, although it has grown in recent years, the Chinese stock market is still relatively small compared with the banking sector. Due to poor regulation and to the fact that a substantial number of listed firms are controlled by the state, the stock market is not very efficient and stock prices do not reflect fundamental values (Allen et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2009 ). Financial markets in China have therefore not been playing a very efficient role in allocating resources and relieving financial constraints, which are a 1 Some researchers (e.g. Bernanke  Gertler, 1989) refer to agency costs as those deadweight losses, which, in the presence of asymmetric information, prevent to reach optimal financial arrangements between borrowers and lenders. These agency costs translate themselves in a higher cost of external finance compared to internal funds. Hereafter, we refer to these as financing constraints, and only consider as agency problems those arising from conflicts of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, or between managers and shareholders. 2 According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Statistical Yearbook of China (various issues), China has experienced a rapid growth rate, which reached an average of 13.2% per year over the 1998-2014 period in terms of GDP (gross domestic product). This incredibly fast growth relied heavily on investment. Over the period 1998-2014, the country experienced in fact an investment boom (the average annual growth rate for total fixed investment was 19.7%), which was responsible for around 50% of GDP growth (NBS Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues).
significant issue for several Chinese firms, and may lead them to under-invest 3 .
At the same time, given the weak legal system and poor corporate governance mechanisms that characterize the country, agency problems are rather severe and likely to lead to over-investment in China's listed sector (Allen et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2011) . For instance, government bureaucrats may use their influence to over-invest in order to achieve their political objectives (Firth et al. 2012) . These effects may be amplified by the presence of soft budget constraints 4 , and widespread corruption (Chow et al. 2010; Firth et al. 2012) .
Excessive investment might cause over-heating and over-capacity, and generate inefficiency, which could impair the sustainable development and future wellbeing in China.
Our work makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we examine underand over-investment at the same time, as we believe that these two types of abnormal investment are likely to coexist in China. Second, unlike most prior research, which examines sensitivities of investment to cash flow (Fazzari et al. 1988; Kaplan & Zingales 1997; Cleary 1999; Cummins et al. 2006) , we focus on the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow. By deducting required (maintenance) and expected investments from capital expenditure, and removing mandated components from cash flow, this approach prevents free cash flow from picking up future investment opportunities. Consequently, in the absence of financing constraints and agency costs, under-and over-investment should not display a systematic response to free cash flow. Our approach provides therefore a powerful and unambiguous test which will help shed light on whether investment inefficiencies in the unique Chinese context can be explained by financial constraints and/or agency problems.
Third, our analysis provides evidence on the extent to which heterogeneity in the degree of financing constraints and agency costs faced by firms affects the sensitivities of under-and over-investment to free cash flow.
Our study is conducted using a large panel of listed Chinese firms over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . We analyze the sensitivity of (under-and over-) investment to free cash flow across groups of firms sorted according to different characteristics. In doing so, we adopt the framework proposed by Richardson (2006) to construct firm-level under-and over-3 Hereafter, we define over-investment (under-investment) as investment expenditure beyond (below) its optimal level. We therefore refer to both under-and over-investment as abnormal investment. In addition, we argue that the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow can be seen as evidence of investment inefficiency due to financial constraints and/or agency problems. It should be noted that there are other ways to measure investment inefficiency: for instance, Chen et al. (2014) focus on the sensitivity of investment expenditure to Tobin's Q. 4 In the presence of soft budget constraints, state-owned enterprises are in fact always bailed out even if they suffer from chronic losses. investment and free cash flow measures. Our empirical results show that a combination of both financing constraints and agency problems explains investment inefficiency in the unique Chinese context. In particular, our findings are consistent with the financial constraints hypothesis (Fazzari et al. 1988) : higher sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow are found for the firms with cash flow below their optimal levels, which are more likely to face financing constraints. Our results are also in line with the agency costs hypothesis (Jensen 1986): higher sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow are spotted in firms with cash flow above their optimal levels, which are more likely to suffer from agency problems. These results are robust to the use of alternative measures of abnormal investment and free cash flow, of different estimation methodologies, and of various alternative criteria to define financial constraints and agency costs.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypotheses regarding firms' investment behavior and its relationship with financial constraints and agency problems. Section 3 illustrates the methodology we use to measure abnormal investment and free cash flow. Section 4 presents our baseline specifications and estimation methodology. Section 5 describes the main features of the data and presents summary statistics. Section 6 discusses and examines our main empirical results and some robustness tests. Section 7 analyzes the extent to which heterogeneity in the degree of financing constraints and agency costs faced by firms affects the sensitivities of under-and over-investment to free cash flow. Section 8 concludes.
Development of hypotheses
In a perfect and complete capital market, investment decisions are not affected by the way firms finance themselves (Modigliani & Miller 1958) , suggesting that in order to maximize their value, firms will implement investment projects until their marginal revenue equals their marginal cost. However, substantial empirical evidence has documented a significantly positive correlation between cash flow and investment expenditure (Fazzari et al. 1988; Hubbard, 1998; Cleary, 1999; Cumming et al., 2006; Bond & Van Reenen, 2007) . The reason for the existence of this positive relation remains, however, controversial.
First, there exists considerable evidence to suggest that the positive correlation between investment and cash flow stems from asymmetric information between corporate insiders and outside creditors (Myers & Majluf 1984; Fazzari et al. 1988; Carpenter & Guariglia 2008) . This can be explained considering that when external finance such as bank loans, debt and equity are used, the imperfections in capital markets lead to a cost premium.
The cost and/or availability of external funds force firms to use internal finance, like retained earnings, in preference to external finance. In these circumstances, financially constrained firms may have to forego good investment projects to avoid the excessively high cost premiums associated with the use of external finance. Thus, when firms face financial constraints, negative cash flow shocks may lead to under-investment. A high sensitivity of under-investment to free cash flow can therefore be seen as evidence of financial constraints.
We refer to this as the financing constraints (FC) hypothesis (H1): Second, the positive correlation between investment and cash flow may reflect two types of agency problems: those between controlling shareholder and minority investors, and those between managers and shareholders (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990; Pawlina & Renneboog 2005 ). In the Chinese context, given the weak legal system, the high restriction of share trading, and the prevalence of dominant shareholders, the first type of agency problems has been found to be prevalent (Liu & Lu, 2007; Jiang et al., 2010) . The risk of controlling shareholders expropriating resources from minority investors (tunneling) is in fact severe. As a result, controlling shareholders are likely to make self-interested and entrenched decisions and prefer to spend the firm's free cash flow on unprofitable projects rather than paying dividends to shareholders, resulting in over-investment. In summary, when firms face agency problems (and in particular are more likely to be subject to tunneling), the more free cash flow they have, the more they prefer to invest, which could lead to over-investment. A positive relationship between over-investment and free cash flow can hence be interpreted as evidence of the presence of agency problems. We refer to this as the agency costs (AC) hypothesis (H2): Taken together, financial constraints and agency problems can prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In other words, both financial constraints and agency problems may increase the sensitivity of investment expenditure to free cash flow and induce investment inefficiency. To discriminate between these two scenarios within the Chinese context, we test hypotheses H1 and H2. Both hypotheses are focused on the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow, which is defined as the cash flow beyond what is required to maintain assets and finance expected new investments (Richardson 2006) . In the two sections that follow, we outline the methodology that we adopt to test these two hypotheses.
3. Methodology used to measure abnormal investment and free cash flow
A framework to measure abnormal investment and free cash flow
We measure both under-and over-investment (abnormal investment) and free cash flow (FCF) using Richardson's (2006) accounting-based framework. Fig.1 . Accordingly, FCF can be either positive or negative, depending on whether net cash flow from operating activities (CFO) exceeds the optimal level of cash flow.
5 It should be noted that Richardson (2006) also includes acquisitions and Research and Development (R&D) expenditure in his proxy for total investment. We chose to use a more parsimonious proxy for two reasons. The first is that capital expenditure is generally used in the finance and economics literatures as a proxy for investment (Hubbard, 1998) . The second is that R&D expenditure is not available in our data. Contrary to us, Richardson (2006) also includes R&D expenditures in his proxy for free cash flow. 6 The reason why we deduct expected investment expenditure (I e _new i,t ) rather than actual CAPEX to calculate FCF is because actual CAPEX can be influenced by financial constraints or agency costs.
Dynamic expectation models of investment expenditure
Following Richardson (2006) , a dynamic investment expectation model is used to predict the expected investment expenditure in new positive NPV projects (I e _new i,t ), which can be interpreted as the optimal level of investment expenditure 7 . Specifically, denoting with I_new the firm's new investment expenditure; with Q (Tobin's Q), its market-to-book ratio; 8 with Cash, its ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; with Size, the natural logarithm of its total assets; with Age, the number of years elapsed since its listing; with ROA, its return on assets 9
; and with Leverage, the ratio of its short-term and long-term debt to total assets, we estimate the following equation:
where the subscript i indexes firms; t indexes years (t=1998-2014); j, industries; and p, provinces. We use a dynamic model to allow for a partial adjustment mechanism and to control for unobserved factors not included among other regressors. We lag all our independent variables (except Age) to alleviate the simultaneity issue (Polk & Sapienza 2009; Duchin et al. 2010 ).
The error term in Eq. (1) is made up of five components. v i is a firm-specific effect; v t , a time-specific effect, which we control for by including time dummies capturing business cycle effects; v j , is an industry-specific effect, which we take into account by including industry dummies; v p , is a province-specific effect capturing uneven developments across different provinces, which we control for by including province dummies; and v j,t takes into account industry-specific business cycles, which we control by including industry dummies interacted with time dummies. Finally,  i,t is an idiosyncratic component.
Estimates of Eq. (1) obtained using the fixed-effects estimator (Fe) and the system GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998) are presented and discussed in the Appendix. The 7 All investment expenditure variables are scaled by total assets. 8 The shares of listed firms in China can be either tradable or non-tradable. Following the literature (Chen et al. 2011; Huang et al. 2011) , we calculate Tobin's Q as the sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book value of non-tradable stocks, and the market value of net debt divided by the book value of total assets. Our results were robust to using the growth of real sales instead of Tobin's Q to proxy for investment opportunities (Konings et al. 2003 ). This test is motivated by the fact that in the Chinese context, Tobin's Q may be an imperfect measure of investment opportunities. 9 As firms in a less developed market may not make investment decisions based on market valuation (Wang et al. 2009 ), contrary to Richardson (2006) . To this end, we interact FCF with the dummy Dum FCF>0 (Dum FCF<0 ), which is equal to 1 if the firm has positive (negative) free cash flow, and 0 otherwise. In accordance with the financing constraints hypothesis (H1), we expect a 2 to be positive and precisely determined for under-investing firms, while, in line with the agency costs hypothesis (H2), a 3 should be positive and significant for over-investing firms
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We also include the dummy Dum FCF>0 in the regression, to account for the direct effect that it 10 All our results were robust to estimating a more parsimonious version of Eq. (1) only including lagged investment, Q, and the dummies. 11 Because free cash flow is defined as operating cash flow net of depreciation and amortization and net of I e _new i,t , positive sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow are unlikely to be caused by free cash flow picking up investment opportunities. Our results were generally robust to estimating a dynamic version of Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). 12 It is important to note that the same firm may face both financial constraints and agency costs at the same time. However, we believe that financing constraints are more pronounced for under-investing firms with negative free cash flow, and that agency costs are more pronounced for over-investing firms with positive free cash flow. See footnotes 21 and 27 for a further discussion of this point. It can be seen that relative to total assets, the average total investment and new investment expenditure in our sample are respectively 5.8% and 2.8%. This suggests that new investment represents a large portion of total investment (around 50%). Moreover, the average free cash flow for all firm-years observations is -0.01. This small value might suggest that listed firms in China are short of free cash flow, which could be due to financial constraints.
[Insert Table 1 and Fig. 2] Interestingly, the total new investment for Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF) is negative. This happens because the depreciation plus amortization of firms in this group exceeds their total investment. Depreciation and amortization can be considered as non-cash expenses: if firms are profitable, they might accelerate depreciation and amortization in order to reduce reported profits.
Coming to unexpected investment and free cash flow, we observe that firms in Group 1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF) have the highest negative unexpected investments and negative free cash flow, which is in line with the hypothesis according to which, due to financial constraints, firms with negative FCF tend to under-invest. As for firms in Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF), they have the second highest positive unexpected investment and the highest free cash flow, which is in line with the hypothesis according to which firms with positive FCF tend to over-invest due to agency costs.
As for other financial and operating variables, the statistics show that compared to firms in other groups, firms in Group 1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF) are relatively younger, smaller, and have lower ROA and high cash reserves. This could suggest the presence of financial constraints. On the other hand, firms in Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF) are relatively mature, large, and have high Tobin's Q, which might suggest higher agency problems.
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Finally, it is interesting to note that the number of firm-years in Group 1 (6,355 observations) is larger than that in Group 3 (3,785 observations), suggesting that there are more firms facing financial constraints than firms susceptible to agency problems. [Insert Table 2] 16 The p-values associated with the t-tests and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test show significant differences in these variables between firms in Group 1 and those in Group 3. 17 With the exception of columns 2 and 4, the p-values associated with the Wald tests show significant differences in the free cash flow coefficients between firms facing negative and positive FCF. Yet, in columns 2 and 4, only the coefficient associated with FCF interacted with the dummy for FCF>0 is statistically significant.
Main empirical results
Baseline results
Robustness tests 6.2.1. Using a quantile estimator
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate Eq. (2) This confirms the robustness of our previous results.
[Insert Table 3 ]
Alternative ways of measuring under-/over-investing firms
Bergstresser (2006) The results, reported, in columns 9 and 10 of Table 3 , confirm once again our hypotheses.
Finally, we use the approach proposed by to compute under-and overinvestment and free cash flow. Following this approach, we compute the abnormal investment for a given firm in a given year (I _new i,t ) can be either positive or negative, corresponding respectively to over-investment or under-investment
18
. As for free cash flow (FCF'), we compute it as the difference between cash flow generated from assets in place (CF AIP,i,t ) for each firm in each year and the industry median level in that same year
. Accordingly, FCF' can be either positive or negative.
To examine the relationship between these alternative measures of (under-or over-) investment and free cash flow, we estimate the following dynamic variant of Eq. (1), where
Dum FCF'>0 is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a positive FCF' i,t , and 0 otherwise:
We use the system GMM approach (Blundell & Bond, 1998) to estimate Eq. (4), accounting for the possible endogeneity of the regressors, as well as for firm-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity. The results are reported in Table 4 . In line with our previous findings, they
show that the impact of free cash flow on under-investment is only significantly positive for the firms with negative FCF' i,t (column 1), whilst the impact of fee cash flow on overinvestment is only significant for firms with positive FCF' i,t (column 2).
[Insert Table 4] In summary, we have constructed measures of under-and over-investment and free cash flow, and generally found a positive and significant relationship between investment 18 As the expected investment estimate based on Bates' method (2005) is an out-of-sample estimate in a group of peer companies, this can tackle the concern that the expected investment based on Richardson's (2006) method might be endogenous. If measuring abnormal investment using both methods delivers similar results, we can conclude that our main results based on Richardson's (2006) Once again, a higher value of the WW index is representative of a higher level of financial constraints. Table 5 presents summary statistics of the two firm-specific indexes of financing constraints across the four groups of firms based on their abnormal investments and free cash flow. We conduct statistical tests for equality of both sample means (t-test) and sample medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) across groups of firms.
[Insert Table 5] According to the financial constraints (FC) hypothesis, firms are more likely to underinvest if they face a higher degree of financing constraints. To test this hypothesis, we compare the two indexes across under-investing firms in Group 1 and Group 2. We find that, regardless of whether we use the mean or the median, the level of financial constraints (measured using both the KZ and WW indices) for Group 1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF) is larger than that for Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF). As can be seen from the p-values of both tests, the differences in the means and the medians of the indicators between the two groups are generally significant at the 5% level. This suggests that differences in the financial constraints faced by firms are a key factor in distinguishing between the firms in Group 1 and Group 2. Thus, as discussed in the former section, financial constraints may contribute to the higher responsiveness of under-investment to free cash flow for the firms in Group 1.
In order to investigate the extent to which the degree of financial constraints faced by 
firms affects the sensitivity of under-investment to free cash flow, Table 6 presents fixed effects estimates of Eq. (3), which tests the effects of free cash flow on under-investment for firms characterized by different degrees of financial constraints, calculated using the KZ index (columns 1 and 2) and the WW index (columns 3 and 4). In columns 1 and 3, following Almeida et al. (2004) , we classify firms as facing relatively low (Low_FC=1), medium (Medium_FC=1), and high (High_FC=1) financial constraints in a given year if their KZ or WW index in that year fall respectively in the bottom three, the middle four, and the top three deciles of the distribution of the indexes of all firms operating in the same industry they belong to.
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In this way, we allow firms in our sample to transit among financial constraint categories each year. In columns 2 and 4, we use a 50% threshold.
[Insert Table 6 
Further tests: Measuring financing constraints using size and age
Next, we use different variables based on the a priori likelihood that a firm faces financial constraints to test our Hypothesis 1. If our hypothesis holds, we should expect a stronger relationship between under-investment and free cash flow for firms which are a priori more likely to face financial constraints. Specifically, we focus on firms' size (total real assets) and age, which have been commonly used in the literature to partition firms into a priori more and less likely to face financing constraints. Small and young firms might not have a sufficiently long track record, leading to increased asymmetric information. In addition, small 20 It is worth mentioning that we do not mean that firms ranked in the top three deciles of the distribution of the KZ and WW indices are absolutely financially constrained, while firms in the bottom three deciles are absolutely financially unconstrained. Instead, we argue that those firms in the top three deciles are likely to face more severe financing constraints than those in the bottom three deciles. 21 Estimating similar regressions on the sample of over-investing firms delivered similar coefficients across the groups of firms characterized by different degrees of financing constraints. These results, which are not reported for brevity but available on request, confirm that the FC hypothesis is unlikely to hold for over-investing firms. The results are reported in Table 7 . In columns 1 and 3, we define a firm as facing a high level of financing constraints (High_FC=1) in a given year if its size (column 1) and age (column 3) fall in the top three deciles of the distribution of the assets/age of all firms operating in the same industry as that firm in that year. Similarly, we define as firm-years facing a medium level of financing constraints (Medium_FC=1) those observations falling in the middle four deciles of the distribution, and as firm-years facing a low level of financing constraints (Low_FC=1), those observations falling in the bottom three deciles of the distribution. In columns 2 and 4, we only consider two categories of firm-years: those facing high and low financing constraints split at the median of real assets (column 2) and age (column 4).
The results in column 1 show a clear increasing trend for the coefficients of free cash flow, moving from large, to medium sized, to small firms. The Wald test reported at the foot of the table shows that the differences in the FCF coefficients between large and small firmyears are significant at the 1% level. Hence, using firm size as a criterion of financial constraints also supports our Hypothesis 1. Similar results are obtained when firm are split in two size categories (column 2), and when age is used as a partitioning criterion (columns 3 and 4) 22 .
[Insert Table 7] In summary, the results we obtained using conventional variables as proxies for financial constraints, which suggests that for under-investing firms, the sensitivities of investment to free cash flow increase with the firm's degree of financial constraints faced by firms, are highly consistent with our previous findings and Hypothesis 1.
The agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment
Measuring agency costs using the ratio of other receivables to total assets and the difference between the blockholder's controlling and ownership rights
We now move on to testing the agency costs (AC) hypothesis of over-investment. . A higher value of OREC implies a higher level of expropriation and, hence, a higher level of agency costs. Average other receivables in our sample constitute about 4% of total assets, and the maximum value of the ratio is around 50%, suggesting a high level of agency costs.
Next, inspired by Claessens et al. (2002) , Lemmon and Lins (2003) , and Jiang et al.
(2010), we proxy the likelihood to tunnel using a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exhibits a difference between its largest shareholder's (also known as blockholder) controlling right (C) and cash flow ownership right (O), and 0 otherwise. In the presence of a divergence between her/his controlling right and ownership right, the blockholder may control the firm by only holding a relatively low proportion of shares. This is made possible through pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms, which often lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders. Table 8 presents summary statistics of our two firm-specific indicators of agency costs after we categorize firms into the four groups based on their abnormal investments and free cash flow. As in Table 5 , we conduct statistical tests for the equality of both sample means (ttest) and sample medians (the Wilcoxon rank-sum test) across groups.
[Insert Table 8 2). The authors explain that these inter-corporate loans are typically reported as "other receivables". This variable is also used by Quian and Yeung (2015) .
for the median, it is higher for Group 3 when we focus on OREC, but equal to 0 for both groups of firms when we focus on C/O
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. These statistics suggest that firms in Group 3 suffer from higher agency costs than those in Group 4. This is not surprising as these firms dispose of a higher FCF, which they can use for tunneling purposes.
To explore this issue further, Table 9 presents the fixed effects estimates of Eq. (3), aimed at testing the effects of changes in free cash flow on over-investment for firms characterized by different levels of agency costs measured using OREC (columns 1 and 2) and C/O (columns 3). Specifically, in column 1, we classify a firm as facing relatively low (Low_AC=1), medium (Medium_AC=1), or high (High_AC=1) agency costs in a given year if its OREC ratio in that year falls respectively in the bottom three, the medium four, or the top three deciles of the corresponding OREC ratios of all firms operating in the same industry the firm belongs to in that year. In column 2, we use a 50% threshold. In both cases, we observe that the sensitivity of investment to free cash flow is positive and significant at the 5% level or higher only for firms with a high degree of agency costs.
In column 3, we define a firm as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if it exhibits (does not exhibit) a divergence between its blockholder's controlling ownership and cash flow ownership. Only those firms characterized by a divergence exhibit a positive and significant sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow
26
. We can therefore conclude that our results generally provide further support to the agency costs (AC) hypothesis 27 .
[Insert Table 9 ]
Further tests: Measuring agency costs using blockholder's and CEO shareholding
To better understand the extent to which agency costs matter for the sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow, in this section, we verify whether our results are robust to partitioning firms on the basis of other variables which have been used in the literature to proxy for the presence of agency problems (Ang et al. 2000 , Jiang et al. 2010 ).
Our first alternative measure focuses on the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder (Blockholder i,t ). It has been argued that concentrated ownership is 25 The statistical tests indicate, however, that only the differences in the means and medians of OREC between the two groups are statistically significant. In the case of C/O, this is not surprising since the median value of the dummy equal to 1 if the firm exhibits a divergence between its blockholder's controlling and ownership rights, and 0 otherwise, is equal to zero for both Group 3 and Group 4. 26 It should be noted, however, that the Wald tests do not reject the equality of the coefficients of free cash flow between firms with high and low agency costs. 27 Estimating similar regressions on the sample of under-investing firms delivered similar coefficients across the groups of firms characterized by different levels of agency costs. These results, which are not reported for brevity but available on request, confirm that the AC hypothesis is unlikely to hold for under-investing firms.
positively associated with firms' agency costs. As mentioned earlier, agency costs, arising from the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholder and minority investors, may become apparent when the controlling shareholder extracts private benefits from minority shareholders (tunneling). The ability of the primary owner to expropriate minority investors is expected to increase with his/her ownership. When the interests of the controlling shareholder are not aligned with those of other investors, there is in fact good reason to believe that the former may use his/her power to influence the firm's investment decisions to promote his/her interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, a high concentration of ownership at the firm level may indicates a strong incentive to tunnel and a high level of agency costs (Liu & Lu 2007) .
However, as discussed in the previous sub-section, primary owners in China, often have rather large power to control the company's operation even by only holding a relatively low stake of shares, through pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. When the primary owner's controlling right is greater than his/her ownership right, he/she tends to derive more benefits from tunneling activities. Thus, a lower incentive to tunnel, and lower agency costs are expected when the highest percentage of shares is held by the primary owner . The ownership stake of the controlling shareholder is therefore definitely an important determinant of the overall agency costs faced by the firm, but whether it affects these agency costs positively or negatively is ambiguous.
In order to test the extent to which the blockolder's shareholding affects the sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow, we construct the dummies Low_share i,t , Medium_share i,t , and High_share i,t , which are in turn equal to 1 if the blockolder's shareholding of firm i in year t lies respectively in the bottom three, the middle four, and the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding shareholding of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise. We then interact these dummies with free cash flow and examine the coefficients of the interaction terms in our over-investment regressions.
The results are reported in column 1 of Table 10 . Interestingly, we observe that the coefficient associated with free cash flow is the largest for the medium shareholding category.
This suggests that, the sensitivity of over-investment to FCF initially increases with the shares held by the largest shareholder, then decreases. which is equal to one if a firm is managed by a shareholder (outsider), and 0 otherwise.
Specifically, if the top executives, including the CEO, are holding any of their own shares, they will be considered as insiders. We then interact free cash flow with the Insider i,t and
Outsider i,t dummies and examine the differences in the coefficients associated with the two interaction terms in our over-investment regressions.
The results appear in column 2 of Table 10 . We observe that a firm managed by an outsider has a significantly higher sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow. This can be explained considering that outside managers may not have closely aligned interests with the firm's shareholders and suggests that managerial ownership is negatively associated with the firm's principal-agent problems.
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Thus, for over-investing firms, agency problems between entrenched managers and shareholders contribute to higher sensitivities of overinvestment to free cash flow.
[Insert 30 In our sample, there is often separation between management and ownership. In addition, those few managers who are also shareholders in their company only hold a small percentage of their own shares. Relative low ownership stakes prevent managers from pursuing their own interests at the expense of shareholders, as they are supervised and controlled by the board, as well as by capital markets.
Hypothesis 2: The sensitivity of abnormal investment to free cash flow rises with the degree of agency costs faced by over-investing firms.
Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a portrait of the nature and balance of financial constraints and agency problems in China, giving a picture of the extent to which the economy has suffered from efficiency losses due to both under-and over-investment. Two significant conclusions emerge from our main findings: On the one hand, the limited access to capital markets which characterizes many Chinese firms leads to significant under-investment. On the other hand, the weak corporate governance structures lead managers or controlling shareholders to overinvest their free cash flow in projects with negative NPV.
The identification of financial constraints and agency problems as explanations for under-and over-investment suggests that in order to improve investment efficiency in China, both the financial and the legal system need to be reformed. In particular, since China's financial system is still dominated by under-developed state-owned banks, in order to sustain the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, especially in the private sector, more widespread access to credit markets should be a priority in order to increase firms' investment efficiency.
In the long run, the establishment of an effective credit-rating system and the development of equity finance could be a way to achieve this target.
In addition, considering that China's listed firms are still dominated by state shareholders, a further reduction in state ownership may need to be carried out to reduce conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and to increase the intensity of monitoring by other shareholders or independent institutions. This is particularly important at the local level. Imposing constraints or more restrictive regulations to local government bureaucrats to prevent them from making adverse decisions such as expropriation and misappropriation of funds, which ultimately lead to over-investment, should therefore be on the political agenda.
Positive steps in both directions have already been taken. With regards to financing constraints, the recent reforms to the financial system documented in Borst and Lardy (2015) are likely to have played an important role in making finance more accessible, to the extent that Lardy (2014) documents a significant increase in the flow of loans to the previously financially discriminated against private sector in recent years. Focusing on agency costs, Cumming et al. (2012) and Hou et al. (2012) argue that the 2005 split share structure reform, which allowed restricted shares held mainly by state shareholders to become tradable, and permitted equity-based compensation for executives or directors, enhanced the incentives of controlling state shareholders to monitor managers, ensuring they were disciplined against opportunistic behavior and refrained from the expropriation of minority shareholders
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. Yet, despite these positive steps, more work needs to be done to completely eradicate investment inefficiency from the Chinese economy. Table A1 illustrates the structure of our panel. Table A2 presents the per year distribution of observations in our dataset.
Appendix
Structure of the panel
Definitions of the variables used
Market value of assets: sum of market value of tradable stocks, book value of non-tradable stocks, and market value of net debt.
Tobin's Q: ratio of market value of assets to book value of total assets.
Return on assets (ROA): ratio of net income to total assets.
Leverage: ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets. Cash: ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
Size: natural logarithm of total assets.
Age: number of years since listing.
Sales growth: rate of growth of real sales. CAPEX: capital expenditures, i.e. cash paid to acquire and construct fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets.
SalePPE : sale of property, plant and equipment, i.e. net cash received from disposals of fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets. I_total: total investment, i.e. capital expenditure less receipts from sale of property, plant and equipment (CAPEX -SalePPE).
I_main.: investment to maintain existing assets in place (depreciation + amortization).
31 To provide evidence on the effectiveness of these positive steps in reducing investment inefficiency in China, we investigated whether the sensitivities of both under-and over-investment to free cash flow change before and after 2008. We found a significant decline in the sensitivities of under-investment to free cash flow in the post-2008 period. Yet, these sensitivities remained positive and highly significant, which suggest that financing constraints did not disappear. As for the sensitivities of over-investment to free cash flow, they became insignificant in the post-2008 period. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. Table A3 provides the fixed effects (Fe), and system GMM estimates of our dynamic model of investment expenditure outlined in Eq. (1). It is worth noting that in a dynamic panel setting, the fixed effects estimator suffers from endogeneity problems. Our preferred estimator is therefore the system Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM) developed by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) . This estimator enables us to control for omitted variables bias, the possible endogeneity of the regressors, as well as firmspecific and time-invariant heterogeneity. Lagged values of the independent variables are used as instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of the regressors (Baum 2006; Roodman 2009 ).
I_new: total investment less investment to maintain existing assets in place (I_total -
I_main.).
Estimates of the dynamic model of investment expenditure (Eq. 1)
In order to evaluate the validity of instruments and the correct specification of the model, two diagnostic tests are used in our GMM estimations. The first is the Hansen (J) test for over-identifying restrictions. The second, m(n), tests for the n th order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and provides a further test for the validity of the specification of the model and the legitimacy of instruments. If the m(n) test rejects the null hypothesis, the instruments need to be lagged at least n+1 times. Since our models generally reject the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation when the instruments are lagged twice, levels of the endogenous variables dated t-3 and further are used as instruments in the firstdifferenced equations, and first-differences of the endogenous variables dated t-2 are used as additional instruments in the level equations (Baum 2006; Roodman 2009 ).
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[Insert Table A3] Column 1 reports the fixed effects estimates, which remove the effect of timeinvariant firm characteristics. The coefficient indicates that around 33% of the total error variance is explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Column 2 presents the estimates obtained using our preferred system GMM estimator, which takes unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity simultaneously into account. More specifically, we treat I_new i,t , Cash i,t , Q i,t ,
Size i,t , ROA i,t, and Leverage i,t as potentially endogenous variables and instrument them using
their own values lagged 3 to 6 times. First-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the level equations. Statistical diagnostics (the Hansen J test and the m(3) test) do not reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity and/or model specification. The system GMM estimate of the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable, I_new i,t-1 , is 0.411. This positive and precisely determined coefficient suggests that investment behavior is sluggish and smooth. In addition, firms' new investment expenditure (I_new i,t ) goes up following increases in cash holdings and ROA, and declines with age. It is interesting to note that Tobin's Q exhibits a poorly determined coefficient, while ROA has a positive and precisely determined coefficient. The profitability of Chinese firms has therefore a greater impact on their investment than the market valuation on investment. This is consistent with the finding from Wang et al. (2009) , who show that in inefficient markets like China, higher profits are associated with higher investment.
32 Neither the Hansen J test nor the m(n) test can distinguish poor specification of the model from instrument invalidity. Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance 58, 1445-1468.
Note: I_total i,t = CAPEX i,t -SalePPE i,t (Capital expenditure-sale of property, plant, and equipment);
CFO i,t = Net cash flow from operating activities;
CF AIP,i,t = Cash flow generated from assets in place;
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Financial Constraints
Agency costs (under-or over-investment) . FCF is free cash flow which is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Cash is the ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Q is the market-to-book ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the number of years elapsed since the firm listed. ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short-and long-term debt to total assets. All variable except Size and Age are expressed in percentage terms. All investment expenditure variables are scaled by total assets. All variables except Age are deflated using the GDP deflator. See the Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in means and equality of medians of corresponding variables between firms in Group 1 and those in Group 3. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity). represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (I u _newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson's (2006) method, where over-investing (under-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I u _newi,t) . FCF is free cash flow which is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Dum_FCF<0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm's free cash flow in that year is negative (FCF<0), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCF>0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm's free cash flow in that year is positive (FCF>0), and 0 otherwise. Under_gmm (Over_gmm) and Under_fe (Over_fe) refer to abnormal investment obtained by estimating Eq. (1) using the system GMM and the fixed effects estimator, respectively (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients for firms facing positive and negative FCF. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Notes: The specifications in columns 1 to 6 were estimated using a quantile estimator with fixed effects, and those in columns 7 to 10, using a fixed effects estimator. For the quantile regression, we run separate regressions for the 20 th , 50 th , 80 th quantiles of abnormal investment with bootstrapped standard errors (1000 repetitions). Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (I u _newi,t) calculated using Richardson's (2006) method, where in columns 1 to 6, under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I u _newi,t). In columns 7 and 8, under-/over-investment are obtained from the estimation of Eq (1) separately in each year using OLS. In columns 9 and 10, we define under-(over-investment) when in a given year, firm i's abnormal investment is below (above) the median value of the distribution of the abnormal investment of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in that year. FCF is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Dum_FCF<0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm's free cash flow in that year is negative (FCF<0), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCF>0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in year t if a firm's free cash flow in that year is positive (FCF>0), and 0 otherwise. For the fixed effects regression in columns 7 to 10, represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients for firms facing positive and negative FCF. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Notes: All specifications were estimated using the system GMM estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Adopting the method of , the dependent variable is I u' _newi,t, the difference between a firm's new investment expenditure (I_new i,t) in a given year and that of the median firm in the industry in which the firm operates (I_newt) in that year. Under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I u' _newi,t ) . FCF'i,t is calculated as the difference between the firm's cash flow generated from assets in place in a given year (CFAIP,i,t) and that of the median firm in the industry in which the firm operates in that year (CFAIP,i.) . Dum_FCF'<0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm's CFAIP,i,t is below its optimal level (proxied by the firm's industry's median CFAIP,i.), and 0 otherwise. Dum_FCF'>0 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm's CFAIP,i,t exceeds its optimal level (i.e. the median of the firm's industry's CFAIP,i.), and 0 otherwise. All variables except Qi,t-1, Sizei,t-1 and Agei,t are scaled by total assets. m2/m3 is a test for (second-) third-order serial correlation of the residuals in the differenced equations, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat I u' _new, FCF', Cash, Q, Size, ROA, and Leveragei,t as potentially endogenous variables. Levels of these variables lagged twice or longer are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables lagged once, as additional instruments in the level equations. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients for firms facing positive and negative FCF'. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in means and equality of medians of the KZ (WW) indexes between groups of under-investing firms (Group 1 and Group 2) or between groups of over-investing firms (Group 3 and Group 4 ). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (I u _newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson's (2006) method, where under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I u _newi,t). FCFi,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). High_FC, Medium_FC and Low_FC are dummy variables, equal to 1 in a given year if a firm faces high, medium, or low financial constraints, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, in columns 1 and 3, we consider a firm to be financially constrained (unconstrained) in a given year if its KZ or WW index lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding variables for all firms belonging to the same industry in that year. The remaining firm-years will be the ones who face a medium level of financial constraints. In columns 2 and 4, a firm is considered to be financially constrained in a given year if its KZ or WW index exceeds the median value of the index calculated in the industry the firm belongs to in that year, and financially unconstrained otherwise. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients across various categories of firms. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 7
Under-investment-free cash flow sensitivities: accounting for financial constraints using size and age Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (I u _newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson's method (2006) , where under-investing firms are characterized by negative abnormal investment (I u _newi,t). FCFi,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Low_FC, Medium_FC, and High_FC are dummy variables equal to 1 in a given year, respectively, if the firm is likely to face low, medium, and high financial constraints relatively to all firms operating in the same industry it belongs to in that year, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, in columns 1 and 2, we consider a firm facing low (high) financial constraints in a given year if its size (real total assets) and age respectively lie in the bottom (top) half of the distribution of the corresponding values of all firms belonging to the same industry in that year. In columns 2 and 4, we consider a firm facing low (high) financial constraints in a given year if its size (real total assets) and age respectively lie in the bottom (top) half of the distribution of the corresponding variables of all firms belonging to the same industry in that year. The remaining firmyears will be those who face a medium level of financial constraints. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients across various categories of firms. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Notes: OREC (other receivable scaled by total assets) and C/O (dummy equal to 1 if the firm exhibits a divergence between controlling and ownership rights, and 0 otherwise) represent firm-specific levels of agency costs. Firms are classified into the following four groups: Group 1 (under-investing firms with negative FCF); Group 2 (under-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 3 (over-investing firms with positive FCF); Group 4 (over-investing firms with negative FCF). P25 (50/75) is the 25 th (50 th /75 th ) percentile of the distribution of the relevant variable. Diff is the p-value associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in means and equality of medians of the firm-level agency costs between groups of under-investing firms (Group 1 and Group 2) or between groups of over-investing firms (Group 3 and Group 4). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 9
Over-investment-free cash flow sensitivities: accounting for agency costs using OREC and C/O Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (I u _newi,t) calculated using Richardson's (2006) method, where under-investing (over-investing) firms are characterized by positive (negative) abnormal investment (I u _newi,t) . FCFi,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow operating from activities (CFO). High_AC, Medium_AC and Low_AC are dummy variables, equal to 1 in a given year if a firm faces respectively high, medium, and low agency costs compared to all firms belonging to the same industry it belongs to, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, in columns 1, we define a firm as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if its OREC lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distribution of the ORECs of all firms operating in its same industry in that year. The remaining firm-years will be the ones with medium agency costs. The remaining firm-years will be the ones who face a medium level of agency costs. As for column 2, a firm is considered as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if its OREC exceeds (is below) the median value of the distribution of the ORECs of all firms operating in the same industry it belongs to in that year. In columns 3, a firm is considered as facing high (low) agency costs in a given year if its blockholder's controlling right exceeds (does not exceed) its cash-flow right in a given year. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients across various categories of firms. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 10
Under-investment-free cash flow sensitivities: accounting for agency costs using blockholder's and CEO shareholding Notes: All specifications were estimated using the fixed effects estimator. Test statistics and standard errors (in parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. The dependent variable is unexpected investment (I u _newi,t) calculated adopting Richardson's (2006) method, where over-investing firms are characterized by positive abnormal investment (I u _newi,t) . FCF i,t is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash flow from cash flow from operating activities (CFO). Blockhoder is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder. High_Share (Low_Share) is a dummy variable equal to 1 in a given year if the percentage of shares controlled by the blockholder in a given firm lies in the top (bottom) three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding percentage of all firms operating in the same industry in that year, and 0 otherwise. For the remaining firm-years, the dummy Medium_Share will be equal to 1. In the column labeled Shareholding_CEO, Insider(Outsider) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm's CEO is (not) holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. Diff is the p-value of the Wald statistic for the equality of the free cash flow coefficients across various categories of firms. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 19,190 19,190 
